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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. LEAVE TO AMEND PLEADINGS MUST BE GRANTED ABSENT SHOWING
OF ACTUAL PREJUDICE TO NON-MOVING PARTY OR BAD FAITH
In Forrester v. Smith & Steele Builders, Inc. (Forrester II)1 the
South Ckrolina Court of Appeals explained that under South Carolina
Rule of Civil Procedure (SCRCP) 15(a),2 the only grounds that will
support a denial of a motion to amend pleadings are prejudice to the
non-moving party and bad faith. The court, by finding no prejudice in
this case, indicated the level of prejudice the non-moving party must
show to prevent an amendment is more than mere undue delay or in-
creased costs. By making the prejudice requirement strict and specific,
the court gave lawyers and trial judges guidance as to how a motion to
amend should be argued and decided.
The case arose in 1985 when Forrester sued Smith & Steele Build-
ers and the City of Mauldin to enjoin construction of a building in
violation of the city's zoning ordinance. Forrester also sought damages,
but only from Smith & Steele because of the city's sovereign immunity.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, abolished sovereign im-
munity in McCall v. Batson3 on April 18, 1985. The trial court heard
motions for summary judgment on May 3, 1985 and on June 3, 1985
granted Forrester's motion against the city.
On appeal from this ruling, the court of appeals reversed the lower
court's granting of summary judgment.4 On remand, Forrester moved
to include a damage claim against the city based on the ruling in Mc-
Call. The trial court denied the motion to amend without giving any
reasons. Forrester appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Forrester's
motion to amend, reasoning that the South Carolina rule on amend-
ments should be given the same interpretation as the comparable fed-
, 1. 295 S.C. 504, 369 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1988). This case results from the parties'
second appearance before the court of appeals. In the first case, Forrester v. Smith &
Steele Builders, Inc., 291 S.C. 196, 352 S.E.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1987) (Forrester 1), the court
of appeals reversed the trial court's granting of summary judgment to Forrester on the
basis that a genuine issue of fact existed. Thus, the case was remanded to the trial court
and Forrester II results from the decision on remand.
2. S.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
3. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
4. See Forrester I, 291 S.C. 196, 352 S.E.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1987).
1
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eral rule 5 since the two rules are substantially the same.6 The federal
rule has been construed broadly to allow amendments unless prejudice
results to the non-moving party. The court rejected the city's assertion
that prejudice could be presumed from such circumstances as undue
delay in offering the amendment, the prolonging of the litigation, the
requirement to engage in extra discovery and pleadings, or the extra
costs involved in defending additional assertions. Based on these cir-
cumstances, the court held that the amendment was not prejudicial to
the city's case.7
In 1985 South Carolina changed from statutory pleading to rules
pleading. Forrester II is the first case to consider thoroughly how
amendments to pleadings operate under the new rules." Because the
new rule is nearly identical to the federal rule on amendments to
pleadings, and South Carolina precedents interpreted only the prior
statutory rule, the court in Forrester II used federal cases almost ex-
clusively to interpret the state's amendment rule.
Since bad faith was not an issue in Forrester II, the court focused
on the city's claims of undue delay and prejudice resulting from addi-
tional pleadings and discovery. The court interpreted undue delay nar-
rowly, conditioning a successful undue delay argument on the showing
of prejudice.' Because the plaintiff only had from April 18, 1985, when
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
6. Forrester II, 295 S.C. at 506-07, 369 S.E.2d at 158. The pertinent part of South
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that "leave shall be freely given when jus-
tice so requires and does not prejudice any other party." S.C. R. Cxv. P. 15(a). The federal
rule does not include the language after the word "requires." See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
The court in Forrester II, however, pointed out that the additional language discussing
prejudice does not mean the South Carolina rule should be interpreted differently than
the federal rule. Forrester II, 295 S.C. at 507, 369 S.E.2d at 158.
7. Forrester II, 295 S.C. at 510-11, 369 S.E.2d at 160.
3. On February 22, 1988, the South Carolina Court of Appeals decided Potomac
Leasing Co. v. Bone, 294 S.C. 494, 366 S.E.2d 26 (Ct. App. 1988), which ruled that
prejudice must be shown to block a proposed amendment. The court in Bone, however,
did not discuss the topic generally.
9. See Forrester II, 295 S.C. at 510-11, 369 S.E.2d at 160. Some jurisdictions have
held that either undue delay or prejudice may be grounds for denying an amendment.
E.g., Bracy v. Sippial Elec. Co., 379 So. 2d 582 (Ala. 1980); Ozark Kenworth v.
Niedecker, 283 Ark. 196, 672 S.W.2d 899 (1984); Hirasa v. Burtner, 62 Haw. 22, 702 P.2d
772 (1985); Hamor v. Maine Coast Memorial Hosp., 483 A.2d 718 (Me. 1984); Hoover v.
Sumlin, 12 Ohio St. 3d 1, 465 N.E.2d 377 (1984); Gardiner v. Word, 731 S.W.2d 889
(Tenn. 1987). Other jurisdictions have required a showing of prejudice before denying an
amendment. E.g., Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 742 P.2d 1346 (Alaska 1987); Eagle
River Mobile Home Park v. District Court, 647 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1982); Associated Wreck-
ing & Salvage Co. v. Wiekhorst Bros. Excavating & Equip. Co., 228 Neb. 764, 424
N.W.2d 343 (1988); Mauney v. Morris, 316 N.C. 67, 340 S.E.2d 397 (1986); Babbs v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 1347 (R.I. 1986); Rosier v. Garron, Inc., 156 W. Va.
861, 199 S.E.2d 50 (1973); Hoiness-Labar Ins. Co. v. Julien Constr. Co., 743 P.2d 1262
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sovereign immunity was abolished, until June 3, 1985, when summary
judgment was granted, to include a claim for damages against the city,
the court said the delay alone was not prejudicial. To prevail on the
undue delay charge, the opponent of the amendment must explain how
the delay has resulted in prejudice to his case.'
The city also argued that the additional pleadings, discovery, and
cost would be prejudicial. Although some federal courts have indicated
additional discovery may be prejudicial," the Forrester I court re-
jected the contention that the requirement of additional time and ex-
pense necessarily would have resulted in prejudice. 2 The court stated,
"We have not been shown the extent of additional discovery the City
claims in this case or how it will prejudice the City."1 3 Consequently, in
South Carolina the non-moving party may use an additional time and
expense argument only to prove some other form of prejudice and not
as a definition of prejudice itself.
The result of Forrester 11 is that a trial judge's discretion in not
permitting amendments is limited. Even if a judge believes a party has
delayed unduly in offering an amendment, a decision to disallow the
amendment will be overruled unless the non-moving party proves the
delay will lead to prejudice. Likewise, refusal to permit a party to
amend because another party may have to engage in additional work
will be reversed unless it can be proven the additional work will result
in prejudice. The South Carolina Court of Appeals has, however, up-
held a denial of leave to amend when the proposed amendment in-
volved a substantial change in the claim."' Although the amended
pleading in Forrester II proposed to add a new cause of action, the
additional claim was not based on the introduction of new facts. If the
claim had been for a cause of action requiring the city to initiate an
entirely new investigation, the court would have been more likely to
have found prejudice.
Forrester II provides practitioners with a narrower base on which
to rest arguments for and against the granting of leave to amend. After
(Wyo. 1987).
10. Forrester II, 295 S.C. at 501, 369 S.E.2d at 158.
11. See Galvan v. Bexar County, 785 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1986) (court permitting
amendment but taking into consideration fact that no additional discovery would be re-
quired); Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1981) (court observing
that amendment introducing new theory of recovery would be prejudicial if discovery
proceedings would have to be repeated).
12. Forrester II, 295 S.C. at 509, 369 S.E.2d at 159.
13. Id.
14. See Porter Bros. v. Specialty Welding, 286 S.C. 39, 331 S.E.2d 783 (Ct. App.
1985) (amendment denied when moving party sought to add claim for attorney fees
based on alleged security agreement).
1989]
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this case it is clear that the non-moving party must show prejudice,
even if the moving party has unreasonably delayed or if granting leave
to amend would require additional expense and work from the non-
moving party.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals declared that SCRCP 15(a)
permits amendments to pleadings unless the non-moving party can
show the amendment is offered in bad faith or that the amendment
will cause prejudice to its case. Undue delay in offering the amendment
and additional discovery, pleadings, and costs necessitated by the
amendment are only relevant when offered to prove some other form of
prejudice to the non-moving party. Undue delay and additional work
and expenses are not ordinarily prejudicial. Forrester II is most signifi-
cant in that it restricts judges' discretion in granting leave to amend
and narrows the scope of arguments available to attorneys within
which to argue for and against amendments to pleadings.
Charles Russell Rogers, Jr.
II. ADOPTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DOES
NOT ALTER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS TO VACATE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT
In Mitchell Supply Co. v. Gaffney 5 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals reaffirmed existing substantive case law requiring a showing of
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" when attempt-
ing to obtain relief from default judgments."6 The court also noted that
defendants still will be required to show a meritorious defense to ob-
tain relief from judgments.17 Although this case does not represent a
departure from existing case law, it is the first appellate decision to
construe South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure (SCRCP) 60(b)(1).
This case arose when default judgment was entered against the
Gaffneys for their attorney's failure to answer Mitchell Supply's com-
plaint. Beverly E. Gaffney, Mary Gaffney and Thomas E. Gaffney (d/b/
a National Electric Company) were sued by Mitchell Supply through
two complaints. The first was a foreclosure of a mechanic's lien and the
second was a personal suit to collect an open account. When Thomas
and Mary Gaffney handed the two summons and complaints to their
attorney, he mistook the second complaint (the personal suit) for a
copy of the first (the mechanic's lien). He advised the Gaffneys that
15. 297 S.C. 160, 375 S.E.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1988).
16. Id. at 162-63, 375 S.E.2d at 322-23.
17. Id. at 163, 375 S.E.2d at 323.
[Vol. 41
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since the suit was in rem, no answer would be required of them as
neither had an interest in the liened property and they would not be
personally liable. The other defendant, Beverly E. Gaffney, the propri-
etor of National Electric Company, was the holder of the liened prop-
erty interest and was in bankruptcy."8
After having received no answer, Mitchell's attorney obtained a
default judgment on the personal suit against all three defendants.' 9
Presumably, Beverly Gaffney, being bankrupt, was immune from judg-
ment. Hence, the entire amount fell against the two remaining
defendants.
When the mistake was discovered, the Gaffneys' attorney moved
to have the trial court set aside the default judgment pursuant to
SCRCP 60(b)(1). 20 The attorney argued mistake and inadvertence on
his part and attempted to show a meritorious defense. The trial judge
granted the relief sought and the plaintiff appealed.2'
The court of appeals reversed the lower court, holding that mis-
takes of counsel were imputed to the represented party.22 The court
applied case law decided under former South Carolina Code section 15-
27-130,"1 precursor to SCRCP 60(b)(1), to reach its decision.24 The
court twice noted that adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure did not alter the substantive requirements for setting aside
a judgment for mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.25 Thus, the
court concluded that the trial judge had abused his discretion and re-
versal was in order.2
6
The South Carolina Supreme Court previously ruled that former
South Carolina Code section 15-27-130, governing relief from default
judgments, was to be construed liberally.2  The court also has stated
that courts should strive to decide cases on their merits and not by
default.28 Nonetheless, relief for unilateral actions leading to default
almost always will be denied. Unless a litigant can show that concur-
18. Id. at 161-62, 375 S.E.2d at 322.
19. Id. at 162, 375 S.E.2d at 322.
20. See id. at 161-62, 375 S.E.2d at 322. South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(1) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
... mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. .. " S.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
21. See Mitchell, 297 S.C. at 162, 375 S.E.2d at 322.
22. See id. at 163-64, 375 S.E.2d at 323-24.
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976)(repealed 1985).
24. See Mitchell, 297 S.C. at 163, 375 S.E.2d at 323.
25. See id. at 163, 164, 375 S.E.2d at 323, 324.
26. See id. at 165-66, 375 S.E.2d at 324.
27. See Gaskins v. California Ins. Co., 195 S.C. 376, 379-80, 11 S.E.2d 436, 437
(1940).
28. See Renny v. Dobbs House, Inc., 275 S.C. 562, 567, 274 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1981).
1989]
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ring actions of a third party contributed to the mistake, inadvertence,
or neglect, courts generally will not excuse the action or inaction that
led to the default judgment.
In Porter Brothers Inc. v. Thompson29 the defendants failed to
respond to an action to collect promissory notes. They claimed they
did not understand the consequences of their failure to respond. The
court of appeals found this excuse insufficient to warrant relief.30 Simi-
larly, in Nicholson v. Mull,"1 the South Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed a denial of a motion to vacate when the defendant in a tort
action (the owner of a biting dog) failed to comprehend that he was
being sued.
32
It is well settled that when the mistake or neglect is due to a
party's counsel, the error will be imputed to the party.3 3 For example,
in Howard v. Holiday Inns, Inc.3 house counsel failed to respond to a
suit because of extensive travel. The supreme court affirmed a refusal
to grant relief. Similarly, in Cassady v. Meares35 the only showing to
support the relief sought was an affidavit stating the attorney simply
had not responded. The supreme court reversed the granting of relief
and reinstated the default judgment.
The supreme court has recognized only one exception to this rule.
Relief will be granted when a party can show that counsel wilfully
abandoned the party. In Graham v. Town of Loris36 the supreme court
allowed relief from summary judgment when the town attorney failed
to appear at a summary judgment hearing, purposefully made himself
29. 284 S.C. 23, 324 S.E.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1984).
30. See id. at 26-27, 324 S.E.2d at 328.
31. 266 S.C. 559, 225 S.E.2d 186 (1976).
32. Id. at 562, 225 S.E.2d at 187. A comparable decision was reached in Ammon v.
Hood, 288 S.C. 278, 341 S.E.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1986), in which a businessman failed to
respond to a tort action commenced by his employee. Other cases in which relief was
denied involved businesses failing to respond due to a breakdown in internal communi-
cations. See Little v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 270 S.C. 305, 241 S.E.2d 529 (1981); see
also, Livingston v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 254 S.C. 161, 174 S.E.2d
163 (1970)(court affirmed refusal to give leave to answer after 20 day period had passed).
33. Clark v. Clark, 271 S.C. 21, 244 S.E.2d 743 (1978); Cassady v. Meares, 266 S.C.
352, 223 S.E.2d 191 (1976); Ledford v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 267 S.C. 671, 230
S.E.2d 900 (1976); Simon v. Flowers, 231 S.C. 545, 99 S.E.2d 391 (1957). The court of
appeals in Mitchell characterized the neglect in Ledford as indistinguishable from that
attributable to the Gaffneys' attorney. See Mitchell, 297 S.C. at 165, 375 S.E.2d at 324.
In Ledford the attorney for an insurance carrier failed to read adequately a case file and
erroneously assumed a suit had been placed in the hands of local counsel. The supreme
court refused to allow such a mistake to be grounds for relief from default judgment. See
id.
34. 271 S.C. 238, 246 S.E.2d 880 (1978).
35. 266 S.C. 352, 223 S.E.2d 191 (1976).
36. 272 S.C. 442, 248 S.E.2d 594 (1978).
[Vol. 41
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unavailable, and resigned by letter two days after the hearing.37 Justice
Ness dissented from the decision, contending the line between neglect
and wilful abandonment is not so clear as to warrant creation of the
exception."' The dissent is persuasive, since Graham apparently devi-
ates from a bright line rule of law. While the holding may be confined
to its peculiar fact pattern and procedural posture (summary judgment
as opposed to default judgment), it certainly remains a viable excep-
tion with potential to result in relief from a judgment.
Relief may be granted when a third party or circumstances beyond
the control of the litigant contribute concurrently with the acts of the
litigant to create the default. This is particularly true if the concurring
acts are procedural and result in misleading the opposing party. For
instance, in Brown v. Weathers9 the supreme court upheld the granting
of relief from default judgment based on ambiguity in the summons
and complaint.40 Similarly, in Strickland v. Consolidated Energy
Products Co.41 the supreme court reversed a refusal to grant relief
when the plaintiff's counsel inadvertently misled the defendant's attor-
ney about an agreement for an extension to answer. Also, relief will be
granted when a complaint is legally deficient for failing to state a claim
for relief.42
Finally, when circumstances warrant, courts may use equitable
powers to set aside or modify a default judgment. The most striking
recent example of this is Roberts v. Peterson.43 In Roberts a school
teacher turned over to her employer suit papers in which both she and
her school were named as defendants in a tort action. The school offi-
cials failed to take action and a default judgment was entered against
both defendants. The court of appeals reversed the refusal to grant
relief.44 It is clear from the opinion the court was concerned about the
equities of the case. The court noted that under McCall v. Batson,"
had the judgment been upheld the teacher would have been unable to
37. Id. at 446, 248 S.E.2d at 599.
38. Id. at 456, 248 S.E.2d at 601 (Ness, J., dissenting).
39. 251 S.C. 67, 160 S.E.2d 133 (1968).
40. See id. at 72-73, 160 S.E.2d at 135. Accord Myers v. Food Town Stores, Inc.,
276 S.C. 571, 281 S.E.2d 108 (1981); Crawford v. Murphy, 260 S.C. 411, 196 S.E.2d 503
(1973); Rochester v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 253 S.C. 147, 169 S.E.2d 387 (1969).
41. 274 S.C. 554, 265 S.E.2d 682 (1980).
42. See Mutual Say. & Loan Ass'n v. McKenzie, 274 S.C. 630, 632, 266 S.E.2d 423,
424 (1980).
43. 292 S.C. 149, 355 S.E.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1987).
44. Id. at 152, 255 S.E.2d at 281.
45. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985) (refusing to permit tort liability for individ-
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seek relief against the school district for its default.46 Although the
court did not expressly invoke equity, equitable principals led the
court to its decision.
Mitchell, the first case to consider relief from default judgment
since adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, is con-
sistent with cases addressing similar issues prior to enactment of the
rules. When a party or his attorney unilaterally fails to conduct the
case properly and suffers a default judgment, the only question re-
maining will be the amount of damages to be paid.
Lloyd W. Walker
III. COURT PERMITS RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OBTAINED THROUGH
FRAUD UPON THE COURT
In 1985 South Carolina adopted a slightly modified version of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). In Evans v. Gunter47 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals had its first opportunity to interpret
modified Rule 60(b). South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure (SCRCP)
60(b) 48 permits a court to relieve a party from final judgment for speci-
fied reasons.4 The state rule differs from the Federal Rule in two re-
spects. First, FRCP 60(b) includes a sixth alternative, which allows
federal courts to overturn a final judgment for "any other reason justi-
fying relief."50 Second, and more important to the present discussion,
FRCP 60(b)(3) includes parenthetical language defining the word fraud
46. Roberts, 292 S.C. at 151, 255 S.E.2d at 281.
47. 294 S.C. 525, 366 S.E.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1988).
48. S.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
49. Id. The rule provides in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discov-
ered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud, misrepresen-
tation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3)
not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken .... This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an inde-
pendent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
Id.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
[Vol. 41
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to include "fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic)." 51
The reporter's note to SCRCP 60 explains the reasons for elimi-
nating FRCP 60(b)(6) from the South Carolina Rules.52 The reporter
noted that "subsection (6) has created ambiguity about what is in-
cluded." 53 No explanation was provided for excluding the parenthetical
language from SCRCP 60(b)(3). This lack of explanation led some
commentators to suggest that South Carolina's rule would not change
the pre-adoption practices of the court.5 ' The prediction became true
in Evans v. Gunter when the court of appeals interpreted SCRCP
60(b)(3) and its impact on a finding of fraud upon the court.
In 1984 Jackie D. Evans Gunter was awarded a divorce from Joel
Frederick Evans. Evans was ordered to pay Gunter $35.00 per week
child support, since the family court found that of their marriage
"'one child, Jennifer Lauren Evans, was born.' ",55 In 1986, Gunter
filed a contempt action against Evans for failing to make child support
payments. Evans moved to stay the contempt proceedings and brought
an action for relief from the family court judgment pursuant to
SCRCP 60.56 Evans alleged several instances of fraud and deceit by
Gunter in obtaining the family court decree and challenged the finding
that he was the father of Gunter's child. Gunter moved to dismiss Ev-
ans' complaint and the motion was granted.57 Evans appealed.
Because Evans brought the action more than one year after the
divorce, and SCRCP 60 is governed by a one year statute of limita-
tions, Evans was precluded from alleging the type of fraud provided for
in SCRCP 60(b)(3).' 8 Thus, under the rule, Evans needed to allege a
fraud upon the court.59 Evans' complaint contained several allegations
of fraud upon the court. Most importantly, he alleged that Gunter had
perpetrated such a fraud by going to Evans' home and seeing that he
became sufficiently intoxicated to sign an "Affidavit of Acceptance of
Service," which stated that Evans waived his right to "answer, demur
or otherwise plead or make an appearance before the court."60
After assuming Evans' allegations as fact, the court of appeals dis-
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
52. S.C. R. Civ. P. 60 reporter's note.
53. Id.
54. See H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 404 (2d ed.
1985).
55. Id. at 526, 366 S.E.2d at 45 (quoting Record at 41).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 526-27, 366 S.E.2d at 45.
58. See S.C. R. Crv. P. 60.
59. See id.; Evans, 294 S.C. at 528-29, 366 S.E.2d at 46.
60. Evans, 294 S.C. at 526-27, 366 S.E.2d at 45.
1989]
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tinguished intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, stating:
Intrinsic fraud refers to fraud presented and considered in the judg-
ment assailed, including perjury and forged documents presented at
trial. Extrinsic fraud refers to frauds which are collateral or external
to the matter tried such as misleading acts which prevent the movant
from presenting all of his case . . . . "Relief is granted for extrinsic
but not intrinsic fraud on the theory that the latter deceptions should
be discovered during the litigation itself, and to permit such relief un-
dermines the stability of all judgments." 1
The court then applied these definitions to the facts of the case, stat-
ing that "[w]hile Gunter's alleged perjury would fall in the 'intrinsic
fraud' category, her actions in inducing Evans to sign such a waiver
form, denying him his opportunity to be heard were such as could be
considered extrinsic fraud under Rule 60(b)."62 Thus, the court of ap-
peals used the inherent powers of the court to set aside the judgment
for fraud upon the court. In so doing, the court defined "fraud upon
the cotirt" to mean extrinsic fraud.
With this decision, the court has continued to apply the reasoning
found in cases prior to adoption of SCRCP 60(b).' 3 Simply, the one
year limitation on collateral actions seeking to overturn a final judg-
ment applies to intrinsic fraud. Collateral actions alleging extrinsic
fraud are not subject to such limitation. The state rule is markedly
different from that found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Federal Rule 60(b) suggests three separate types of fraud: intrin-
sic, extrinsic, and fraud upon the court. Federal courts apply the one
year statute of limitations in actions claiming intrinsic or extrinsic
fraud. The reason for this procedure is twofold. First, the federal
courts seek to eliminate the "very troublesome and unsound distinc-
tion" between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.6 4 Second, federal courts
seek to place a higher burden on individuals attempting to overturn a
judgment after more than one year.65
61. Id. at 529, 366 S.E.2d at 46 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 529, 366 S.E.2d at 47.
63. See Hilton Head Center v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 294 S.C. 9, 362 S.E.2d 176
(1987) (case decided before adoption of SCRCP in which court held that failure of an
adversary to reveal matters which would defeat one's own claim was intrinsic fraud, not
extrinsic fraud, and thus that the suit was barred); Rycroft v. Tanguary, 279 S.C. 76, 302
S.E.2d 327 (1983) (false swearing on the part of a party or witness was intrinsic fraud
and afforded no grounds for equitable interference with a judgment); Center v. Center,
269 S.C. 367, 237 S.E.2d 491 (1977) (failure to receive a summons and complaint before
judgment was rendered, without more, was not extrinsic fraud).
64. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2861 (1973).
65. Great Coastal Express v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1355
(4th Cir. 1982) ("Rule [60] suggests that equitable considerations prevail in such cases
[Vol. 41
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By eliminating the extrinsic versus intrinsic distinction, the fed-
eral courts have been forced to develop a definition of "fraud upon the
court." Finding precise definition elusive,66 "'fraud on the court' is
typically confined to the most egregious cases, such as bribery of a
judge or juror, or improper influence exerted on the court by an attor-
ney, in which the integrity of the court and its ability to function im-
partially is directly impinged.
6 7
Because the advisory committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure used Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co."" as an ex-
ample of fraud on the court, many federal courts looked to Hazel-Atlas
for guidance.69 Hazel-Atlas involved a patent attorney who wrote an
article on a particular process upon which the company he represented
sought a patent. The attorney then submitted the article under the
name of an "impartial" author. Although this article was just one of
numerous documents later included in the record during a subsequent
copyright case, the federal court of appeals made great use of the arti-
cle. Thus, when the true author of the article was discovered, the Su-
preme Court held that it was within the equity power of the federal
courts to overturn the prior judgment.
70
Because of the facts of Hazel-Atlas, many federal courts have fo-
cused on attorney involvement as a bright line test to determine if
there has been fraud on the court.7 1 Other federal courts have contin-
ued the intrinsic versus extrinsic distinction, suggesting that once clas-
sified as extrinsic, the level of fraud is then determinative as to
whether there has been fraud on the court.
7 2
South Carolina has avoided this difficulty by simply defining
"fraud upon the court" as extrinsic fraud and eliminating the paren-
for one year, and that the interest in finality of judgments prevails thereafter."), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1128 (1983).
66. See id. at 1356 ("The federal courts that have struggled with the definition of
'fraud on the court' in the context of Rule 60(b) have found such a definition elusive.").
67. Id.
68. 322 U.S. 238 (1944), overruled by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S.
17 (1976).
69. See, e.g., Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1355.
70. See id. at 1355-56 (summarizing and addressing the importance of the Hazel-
Atlas decision).
71. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1985) (perjury
is not fraud on the court when there is no allegation of attorney involvement and no
evidence of interference with the court's impartial operation).
72. See, e.g., Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1357 (perjury and fabricated evi-
dence are evils that should be exposed at trial, but are not sufficiently egregious to be
considered fraud on the court); Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1981) (perjury
was not an issue of extrinsic fraud and did not provide sufficient grounds for relief), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982).
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thetic language from SCRCP 60(b). Thus, South Carolina has avoided
the necessity of attempting to define a third type of fraud and, in es-
sence, clarified the types of fraud capable of sustaining a collateral at-
tack on a final judgment.
Richard R. Gleissner
IV. SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS BARRED
BY RES JUDICATA WHEN RELATED TO CLAIMS VOLUNTARILY ASSERTED IN
PREVIOUS ACTIONS
The court of appeals illuminated the doctrine of res judicata in
Gathings v. Robertson Brokerage Co. 73 when it held that a properly
joined third-party defendant may have unrelated claims asserted
against him, but that once such claims are asserted all claims relating
to the newly introduced subject matter should be asserted or res judi-
cata will operate as a bar in a later action.7 4 Although the holding may
be perceived initially as too broad, a narrow construction of the hold-
ing aligns it with established res judicata principles.
Robertson Brokerage Co. (Robertson) acquired Allstate Food Bro-
kers, Inc. (Allstate). After the acquisition, a former stockholder, W.F.
Ward, sued Robertson, alleging it defaulted on Allstate's obligation to
pay him for his stock and his agreement not to compete. Robertson
then impleaded Gathings as a third-party defendant based on his
agreement to indemnify Robertson for any undisclosed liabilities of
Allstate, as well as claims alleging Gathings' failure to disclose liabili-
ties of Allstate related and unrelated to Ward.75
At the time he was impleaded, Gathings had already filed suit
against Robertson for defaulting on agreements to pay him. Ward's
case, however, was tried first. When Gathings' case finally was tried,
Robertson asserted counterclaims against Gathings based on Gath-
ings's indemnification agreement and on new allegations connected to
the unrelated claims raised in the Ward suit.7 6
The court stated that once Robertson impleaded Gathings pursu-
ant to South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure (SCRCP) 14(a),7 it
could have confined its basis for indemnification to claims related to
Ward's claims and would have faced no res judicata bar.78 Robertson,
73. 295 S.C. 112, 367 S.E.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1988).
74. Id. at 118, 367 S.E.2d at 427.
75. Id. at 113-14, 367 S.E.2d at 424-25.
76. See id. at 114, 367 S.E.2d at 425.
77. S.C. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
78. Gathings, 295 S.C. at 117, 367 S.E.2d at 426.
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however, chose to assert claims unrelated to the Ward claims. Joinder
of such claims is permitted, but not required, by SCRCP 18(a)."9 Thus,
after asserting the unrelated claims, Robertson was required to raise all
of its claims against Gathings that addressed the subject matter of the
unrelated claims and that might have been litigated."0
When Robertson impleaded Gathings for the indemnification
claim, it appropriately joined several unrelated claims as permitted by
SCRCP 18(a). The court approved this procedure as correct under
Rules 14(a) and 18(a), but went on to state that a "decision in a prior
action conclusively settles not only claims actually litigated, but also
all matters which might have been litigated in that action."8'
The broad language of the opinion may be inferred to require im-
plicitly that all claims, even those totally unrelated to the ones volun-
tarily asserted, be asserted or forever barred as a matter of law. Such
an implication, however, would amount to a mandatory joinder provi-
sion unprecedented in the federal and state rules of procedure. In ef-
fect, it would require every conceivable claim to be asserted and would
penalize the hapless defendant who did not imagine all possible future
claims. Traditionally, collateral estoppel principles may apply; 2 res
judicata principles would not.83 Therefore, the Gathings holding
should be narrowly construed.
Johanna Searle
V. FEDERAL COURT HELD PROPER FORUM FOR SUITS REQUIRING
CONSTRUCTION OR APPLICATION OF COPYRIGHT ACT
Copyright law in South Carolina is relatively undeveloped. One ex-
planation for the lack of cases is the expansion of the federal court
system and its preemption power to hear copyright cases. A recent
South Carolina Court of Appeals decision, Maxey v. R.L. Bryan Co., 4
emphasizes this state's obligation and commitment to direct cases
based on federal law to federal courts. This case sets forth guidelines
for determining if a cause of action arises under federal copyright law
by focusing on the substance of the claim and the necessary proof.
79. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
80. See Gathings, 295 S.C. at 118, 367 S.E.2d at 427.
81. Id. at 117, 367 S.E.2d at 426 (citing Nunnery v. Brantley Constr. Co., 289 S.C.
205, 345 S.E.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1986)).
82. See, e.g., Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 51 S.E.2d 622 (1947).
83. See 46 Am. Jua 2D Judgments § 430 (1964); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTs §§ 56,
59, 60 (1942).
84. 295 S.C. 334, 368 S.E.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1988).
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Based on the court's thorough analysis, determining the proper forum
in which to adjudicate copyright disputes now can be done more easily.
The litigation arose when Russell B. Maxey alleged that publisher
R.L. Bryan Co. breached its contractual duty to obtain a copyright for
his book, Historic Columbia. The publisher's failure resulted in publi-
cation of some of Maxey's materials in two newspapers, The State and
The Columbia Record. Maxey first brought suit in federal court against
the newspapers for infringement, but due to lack of copyright, he was
unable to prove his claim. Maxey then brought suit against R.L. Bryan
Co. in state court for not securing the copyright, seeking statutory rem-
edies he would have recovered in the earlier suit had he won. R.L.
Bryan moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because the dispute could be resolved only by application of the Fed-
eral Copyright Act (Act). 5 The lower court denied the motion and R.L.
Bryan appealed.
6
The court of appeals held that the cause of action belonged in fed-
eral court because the Federal Copyright Act controlled.8 7 Under the
applicable federal jurisdictional statute, federal district courts "'shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the
states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.' "88 De-
ciding this claim arose under the Copyright Act and that, therefore,
Maxey's suit should be dismissed, the court of appeals' decision is in
accord with numerous other state and federal decisions. Most of these
courts follow the three-pronged test established in T.B. Harms v.
Eliscu.80 The test provides:
[A]n action "arises under" the Copyright Act if and only if the com-
plaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, . . . or asserts a
claim requiring construction of the Act, . . . or, at the very least and
perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of
the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the
claim. 0
Based on these criteria, the validity of Maxey's claim depended on
construction of the Copyright Act in three specific areas. First, to de-
termine if R.L. Bryan breached its contract, Maxey had to prove that
R.L. Bryan failed to secure a copyright. Since sections 408 through 412
85. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-914 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
86. Maxey, 295 S.C. at 335-36, 368 S.E.2d at 467.
87. Id. at 342, 368 S.E.2d at 471.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982), quoted in Maxey, 295 S.C. at 336, 368 S.E.2d at 467.
89. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
90. Id. at 828.
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of the Act9 1 govern registration of the copyright, "construction of the
Act is required to determine whether R.L. Bryan breached the contract
with Mr. Maxey by not registering the copyright." 92 Second, Maxey
had to establish that a third party infringed upon his copyright. Sec-
tions 501 through 510 of the Act9 3 must be construed to determine
whether an infringement occurred.94 Finally, Mr. Maxey could recover
only under specific sections of the Copyright Act, which authorize the
particular remedies he sought.
9 5
For the court to determine that Maxey's claims were rooted in fed-
eral law, the complaint had to provide a basis for finding federal law to
be applicable. The well-pleaded complaint rule requires courts to look
at the allegations in the complaint to decide if federal law governs. 9 If
the nature of the principal claim asserted by the plaintiff is governed
by federal laws, then the state court has no jurisdiction.97
Maxey's principal claim was for breach of a contract, which gave
rise to an infringement and entitled him to statutory remedies. Maxey
failed to recognize the application of the Copyright Act to his claims
by focusing on the breach instead of what was required to prove and
remedy that breach.
The court of appeals' analysis of federal preemption of Maxey's
claim is in accord with most other jurisdictions that have decided the
issue. When breach of contract is alleged in the complaint, most courts
will center their inquiry on what law will provide an adequate remedy.
For instance, in Underhill v. Schenck,"5 the plaintiff sued the defend-
ant for breaching their partnership agreement. Even though the de-
fendant failed to pay plaintiff royalties from copyrighted materials, the
court characterized the wrongdoing as a breach of fiduciary duty. Be-
cause state law provided an adequate remedy for such a breach with-
out applying the Copyright Act, the state court had jurisdiction.9 9
Federal jurisdictions also focus on the substance of the claim to
91. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 408-412 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
92. Maxey, 295 S.C. at 339, 368 S.E.2d at 469.
93. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-510 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
94. Maxey, 295 S.C. at 339, 368 S.E.2d at 469.
95. Id.
96. The well-pleaded complaint rule has been stated as follows: "'[W]hether a case
is one arising under... a law.., of the United States... must be determined from
what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the [complaint],
unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses. . . ."' Vestron v.
Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vocation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)).
97. Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983).
98. 238 N.Y. 7, 143 N.E. 773 (1924).
99. See id. at 13-14, 143 N.E. at 775.
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decide jurisdiction. In Bear Creek Productions, Inc. v. Saleh'00 a New
York district court held that the state court should have jurisdiction
because the complaint revealed the dispute was over ownership of the
copyright, not an infringement.10' Since the contract between the par-
ties governed ownership rights, the state court had jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit explained the rationale for determining juris-





"If [the] claim involves copyright infringement or other matter di-
rectly related to the interpretation and enforcement of the Copyright
Act, jurisdiction has been upheld. On the other hand, where it has
been determined that the claim is essentially for some common law or
state-created right, most generally for a naked declaration of owner-
ship or contractual rights, jurisdiction has been declined [in federal
courts], even though the claim might incidentally involve a copyright
or the Copyright Act."''
The court of appeals in Maxey correctly determined that this was
not a claim for a naked declaration of contractual rights, since an in-
fringement was an essential part of the claim and Maxey sought statu-
tory remedies. Numerous other federal cases support the analysis in
this decision, including a Fourth Circuit case, Christopher v.
Cavallo.104 Like Maxey, Christopher involved two separate suits.
Michael Christopher contracted with playright Ardith Cavallo to pro-
duce a play about Peter Pan. Cavallo assured Christopher that she
owned title to the play, despite the fact that another play about Peter
Pan existed. Once the original playowners discovered the plans for this
production, they sued Christopher for an injunction and damages.
Christopher sued Cavallo in state court for breach of warranty of title.
The court held that in order for the plaintiff to prove breach of war-
ranty, he had to prove the existence of an infringement, which required
construction of the Copyright Act. Accordingly the court held the dis-
pute was one within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.105
Another recent federal case emphasized that federal courts may
preempt a state claim if the plaintiff primarily seeks a statutory rem-
edy. In Vestron Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc.'06 the Ninth Circuit held
100. 643 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
101. Id. at 492.
102. 698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983).
103. Id. at 993 (quoting Royalty Control Corp. v. Sanco, Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 641, 642
(N.D. Cal. 1972)).
104. 662 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1981).
105. Id. at 1083-84.
106. 839 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).
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that because the plaintiff sought infringement remedies under sections
504 and 502 of the Copyright Act, the federal court had jurisdiction. 10 7
Furthermore, the court indicated that seeking statutory remedies com-
pels the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction, even if the other T.B.
Harms criteria are not met.
10 8
The analysis the court of appeals applied to the Maxey decision
reveals the great deference state courts must give federal courts in
cases based on the Copyright Act. Even though a common law state
claim appears in the complaint, the underlying basis and proof of that
complaint requires construction of federal law. Therefore, in order to
determine the proper forum for jurisdiction, plaintiffs must establish
what they hope to recover and how they intend to obtain the remedy
they seek.
If a dispute arises involving copyrighted material, the plaintiff
must concentrate on the remedy sought and the proof needed to sub-
stantiate his claim. For instance, if a contract exists requiring one
party to create the copyrighted work and the other party to distribute
it, a suit for a breach of contract may be brought in state court. The
remedy is based on the contract terms and proof of those terms sub-
stantiates the claim. No construction of the Copyright Act is necessary.
Conversely, if a defendant breaches a contract by not acquiring a
copyright or by copyright infringement, then state remedies are inade-
quate. The Copyright Act governs what is required to obtain a copy-
right and it provides the recourse for infringement. The lawyer's cru-
cial job is to decide initially if the claim is actually for an infringement
or for a remedy provided by state law. Although the inclusion of a
copyrighted work in a claim is not enough to warrant federal jurisdic-
tion, if the claim falls within the scope of T.B. Harms, federal jurisdic-
tion will prevail.
This test for "arising under federal law," which was clarified in
Maxey and focuses on the substance of the complaint, also will affect
cases involving patent materials, since they may fall under federal ju-
risdiction as well. The Appellate Court of Illinois addressed the issue
as it relates to patents in Burke v. Pittway Corp.""8 The plaintiff in
Burke brought an action in state court to recover damages from a de-
fendant who failed to pay him royalties from a patent pursuant to
their agreement. The court upheld state court jurisdiction because it
found no dispute as to the validity of the patent."" The court noted
that the "general rule is that a suit by a patentee for royalties under an
107. Id. at 1382.
108. See id. at 1381-82.
109. 63 IMI. App. 3d 354, 380 N.E.2d 1 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979).
110. Id. at 362, 380 N.E.2d at 6.
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assignment by him or for any remedy sought pursuant to a contract
permitting use of a patent is not a suit under the patent laws of the
United States." '
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached
a similar decision regarding federal jurisdiction in another patent case,
Beghin-Say International, Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen.-"2 The plain-
tiff in that case brought suit to have title declared on patent property
that was assigned to him. Deciding the federal district court had no
jurisdiction, the court held the "plaintiff must have asserted some right
or interest under the patent laws, or at least some right or privilege
that would be defeated by one or sustained by an opposite construction
of those laws.11 3 Analogous to copyright decisions, the court deter-
mined that unless the question presented in the complaint involved
patent validity, infringement or patent antitrust, federal courts would.
have no jurisdiction. "No Act of Congress relating to patents within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) spells out criteria for determining
what does or does not constitute a conveyance by contract." '114
The South Carolina Court of Appeals in Maxey v. R.L. Bryan Co.
followed the rationale of most other jurisdictions providing guidelines
for determining if a copyright, patent or trademark dispute belongs in
federal court. Because the analysis for jurisdiction focused on what was
necessary to establish the claim, the Maxey decision reveals the broad
scope of federal court jurisdiction. After Maxey, South Carolina courts
required to determine jurisdiction must examine the substance of the
complaint, not just the form of the action. The court's analysis and
conclusion in this case clearly illustrate the broad power federal courts
have over claims involving federal law and, perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the significant degree to which South Carolina courts will defer
to that power.
Elizabeth M. McMillan
111. Id. at 356, 380 N.E.2d at 3 (citing Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496
(1926)).
112. 733 F.2d 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
113. Id. at 1570 (citing Excelsion Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U.S.
282 (1902)).
114. Id. at 1571.
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